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case in its interpretation of what the parties did not contemplate or anticipate, but, as the Iowa case shows, an opposite result may be reached by a
different interpretation. The ultimate question then is in deciding what
parties to contract might anticipate and guard against or what they cannot
be assumed to have anticipated and guarded against.
C. F. B.
TORTS--INSURANCE-DUTY OF INSURANCE COMPANY ON RECEIPT OF AN

AYPLICATIN-M. B. made application for life insurance. Company delayed
action twenty days, and then refused the application and dispatched a substitute policy to the Indianapolis office, where it was received two days later.
No attempt was made to deliver that policy until eight days later, when an
agent calling to deliver the policy, refused to do so on learning that M. B.
the previous day had contracted a severe cold. Prior to taking the cold,
M. D. was an insurable risk, but thereafter and until her death he was not.
A reasonable time for delivery of the policy after the application was ten
days, while in fact thirty days elapsed before the attempted delivery. A
reasonable time for delivery after receipt at the Indianapolis office was
twenty-four hours, while the actual time elapsed was nine days after receipt. R. B. as administrator of M. B. sued for damages for failure to act
promptly on the application, and for' failure to deliver the policy promptly,
before M. B. became ill. Verdict and judgment were for plaintiff. Held,
that judgment must be reversed. The basis for reversal was stated to 43e
that the company owed no duty either statutory or contractual; and that,
without a duty being imposed, the company was not liable for unreasonable
delay. The "tort liability doctrine" was stated to be inapplicable since the
premium was not paid in advance. Metropolitan Insurance Co. V. Brady,
Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 30, 1930, 174 N. E. 99.
The application was treated as an offer for a unilateral contract to be
accepted by delivery of the policy. This offer was rejected, and a counter
offer for a unilateral contract made by sending a substitute policy, which
was to be accepted by payment of the first premium. Since there was no
delivery, there could be no acceptance, and no contract was consumated.
The court was correct therefore in saying that no contract duty arose to act
promptly, since there was no contract. The court did not repudiate the
tort liability doctrine, but it made the distinction that it did not apply to
cases in which the premius was not paid in advance. The cases depending
upon tort liability have been cases in which the premium was paid in advance, Duffie v. Bankers Ass'n, 160 Ia. 19, 139 N. W. 1087, being a typical
example. For a criticism of placing contract limitations on this tort liability, see 40 Yale L. J. 121 (1930).
The distinction made in this case overlooks the stipulation which permitted the payment of the premium on the delivery of the policy. Yet the
court in touching on the agent's representation that it was not necessary to
pay it until the delivery of the policy, when the premium was offered with
the application, stated that it was not inconsistent with the application.
Though payment of the premium is stated to be one of the elements on
which tort liability is based, it is but one of the conditions for the application of the duty to act with reasonable promptness. Nor does it seem logical
to consider it the most important, since the applicant is permitted to reject
the policy and recover the premium. Another element is that the applicant
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refrains from seeking insurance elsewhere in justifiable reliance on the
prompt consideration of his application. The main element, however, seems
to be that the company accepted a charter to engage in a business affected
with a public interest. To permit the company to avoid the duty to act
promptly by inducing the appellant not to pay the premium in advance, is
to permit fraud, not only against the applicant, but also against the state
which granted it permission to engage in business within the state. Furthermore the company, if the insurance is effected, receives compensation
for a risk it did not assume, namely the interim between the application
and the attachment of liability which is stipulated to be after delivery of
the policy and the payment of the first premium, and under the rule announced in this case, is permitted to increase that period at will.
The basis for liability should not depend on the payment of the premium
in advance. The business of insurance is a public calling, and therefore
subject to regulation. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389.
This regulation has been permitted even to the extent of limiting the rates
and also the compensation of agents. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 51 Sup. Ct. R. 130. This is additional proof that the insurance
business is a public calling, as the Supreme Court of United States has
declared that rates cannot be regulated outside of public callings. Williams
v. Standard Oil, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 278 U. S. 235. Since it is a public calling,
the public calling duties should attach. Among these are the duties to
furnish reasonably adequate facilities, and to act with due diligence. Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio State R. 301. Thus such delay as was present in this case would be a violation of a public calling duty, and would
give rise to a cause of action for the loss occasioned thereby. Such duty
being imposed, the company should not be able to avoid its liability by
inducing the non-payment of the premium until after the delivery of the
policy, but should be liable in all events for negligent delay resulting in
loss to the applicant, a much more desirable result in view of its public
calling character.
H. N. F.
WILLS-LATENT AMBIGUITY-INTENTION OF TEsTAToR-One W. R. Meredith died leaving a will setting out the following items: "The balance of
my property of every kind, character, and description, real and personal,
I will and bequeath in fee simple to my first and my second cousins living
at my death... ." There are 15 first cousins and 136 second cousins and
according to ancestry they were divided into five groups. The plaintiff, in
a suit to partition the property, attacked the will, contending that the testator meant only the first and second cousins of the Meredith group. The
lower court heard testimony concerning the testator's intention but held
against plaintiff because there was no ambiguity on the face of the will.
Held, affirmed. There were parties fulfilling the description of the beneficiaries both at the time of making and death; and there is no ambiguity in
the will. Parol evidence to vary the express language of a will is inadmissible. Rodarrnel v. Gwinnup. Appellate Court of Indiana, 1930, 173 N. E.
327.
On the principal point the decision is easily sustained. There was no
ambiguity, either latent or patent. The words used had a clear and definite
meaning, and actually referred to individuals who could be identified with-

